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 Abstract  Although Descartes and Malebranche argue that we are immaterial 
thinking things, they also maintain that each of us stands in a unique experiential 
relation to a single human body, such that we feel as though this body  belongs to us 
and is  part of ourselves . This paper examines Descartes’s and Malebranche’s 
accounts of this feeling. They hold that our experience of being embodied is 
grounded in affective bodily sensations that feel good or bad: namely, sensations of 
pleasure and pain, hunger and thirst, and so on. These bodily sensations ground our 
experiential identifi cation with the body because they represent the body’s needs 
and interests as though they were own, such that we experience an important aspect 
of our well-being as consisting in the preservation of the body. According to these 
Cartesians, then, we feel embodied in part because we experience ourselves as hav-
ing a bodily good. 
 Introduction 
 When  Descartes is doing  metaphysics , he argues that we are  immaterial thinking 
things. 1 But he also maintains that each of us stands in a unique experiential relation 
to a single human body, such that we  feel as though this body is part of ourselves. In 
 Meditation 6, when the meditator reviews “those things which, as they were per-
ceived by the senses, I previously thought to be true”, she 2 reports, “I sensed that I 
had a head, hands, feet and other limbs making up the body which I regarded 
[ spectabam ] as part of myself, or perhaps even as my whole self” ( M6 , AT VII 74/
1  For example, see  M2 , AT VII 27/CSM II 18;  Discourse IV, AT VI 33/CSM I 127; and  Search for 
Truth , AT X 521/CSM II 415. For an explanation of abbreviations, short titles, and citation forms, 
see “Short Titles and Abbreviations for Primary Texts” at the end of the essay. 
2  To keep Descartes and his fi ctional narrator (i.e. the meditator) of the  Meditations distinct, I shall 
refer to the meditator with the feminine pronouns “her” and “she”. In this case, however, the medi-
tator seems to be speaking for Descartes. 
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CSM II 51–52). 3 Since the meditator is explaining what she “perceived by the 
senses”, the meditator’s claim that she “regarded” the body as part of herself can be 
read in a phenomenological register, i.e. as concerning her  experience of the body. 
Malebranche picks up on this phenomenological strain in Descartes, and then runs 
with it. 4 
 This paper examines Descartes’s and Malebranche’s accounts of the feeling that 
one human body is  mine and  part of myself . In the contemporary literature, this feel-
ing is often called a “sense of bodily ownership”. 5 Elsewhere I argue that many 
factors contribute to this experience. 6 In this paper, I will focus on the evaluative 
aspect of our bodily experience. More specifi cally, I focus on the way affective 
bodily sensations – such as bodily  pleasures and pains, feelings of hunger and thirst, 
and so on – ground our identifi cation with the body. By characterizing these bodily 
sensations as affective, I mean to highlight the fact that these sensations feel good 
or bad. The pleasant sensation of warmth that I experience when I’m sitting by a fi re 
feels good. Hunger feels bad. Nausea feels awful. Intense thirst is torture. Not all 
bodily sensations are affective, however. Some proprioceptive sensations might be 
neutral in this regard. For example, my proprioceptive awareness of the position of 
my limbs – say, that they are crossed – might feel neither good nor bad. 
 The plan is as follows. First, I sketch Descartes’s and Malebranche’s accounts of 
sensory experience as a complicated psycho-physiological process. Second, I clar-
ify the target phenomenon, by explaining the different ways they characterize the 
sense of bodily ownership. Third, I provide textual evidence that they take affective 
bodily sensations to make a special contribution to our experiential identifi cation 
with the body. Fourth, I argue that, according to Descartes and Malebranche, these 
affective bodily sensations make us feel as though it is good for us to pursue the 
body’s good. This identifi cation with the body’s well-being grounds the feeling that 
the body is part, and perhaps even the whole, of ourselves. In short: we feel embod-
ied because we experience ourselves as having bodily needs and interests. 
 For the purposes of this paper, I will bracket the question of whether there is any 
truth in the feeling of bodily ownership, or whether it is a gross illusion. My  inten-
tion here is simply to focus on this aspect of  Cartesian  phenomenology . 7 More 
3  See  M6 , AT VII 76/CSM II 52;  M6 , AT VII 80/CSM II 56;  and Letter to Elizabeth, 28 June 1643 , 
AT III 694/CSMK III 228. 
4  Interestingly, Merleau-Ponty reads Malebranche as a kind of proto-phenomenologist as well 
(Merleau-Ponty  1968 ). See for example,  Search , V.5, OCM II 172/LO 365;  Search , I.12.5, OCM I 
137–138/LO 58;  Christian Meditations , XI.15, OCM X 122; and  DM V.7, OCM XII 118/JS 78. 
5  See Brewer ( 1995 ), Martin ( 1995 ), de Vignemont ( 2007 ). 
6  In my dissertation, I argue that I experience one human body as mine and part of myself because 
I experience this body as though it were the subject of my mental life. More specifi cally, I experi-
ence one human body as mine because: (1) I experience this human body as the subject of my acts 
of sensing, (2) I experience this body as the subject of my volitions/inclinations to move this body, 
and (3) I experience the states of this body as determining my well-being. 
7 Although there has been increasing attention to the metaphysics of the union between mind and 
body, less attention has been paid to what it is like to be embodied according to the Cartesians. 
There are a few notable exceptions, however. See, for example:  Gueroult (1959) , Gouhier ( 1962 ), 
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 specifi cally, my intention is to describe Descartes’s and Malebranche’s accounts of 
the way the body is presented in sensory experience from the perspective of the 
experiencing subject. Apart from its intrinsic interest, the Cartesian phenomenology 
of embodiment is important for understanding the mind-body union. In his corre-
spondence with  Elizabeth , Descartes insists that the senses provide us with our best 
grasp of the union ( Letter to Elizabeth, 28 June 1643 , AT III 692/CSMK III 227). 8 
This claim suggests that the way to investigate the nature of the union is to take our 
ordinary, pre-theoretical experience of embodiment as our starting point, and then 
to fi gure out what, if anything, is true in this experience. In other words, we need to 
 purify our bodily experience. But we will only be in a position to determine what is 
veridical in our experience of embodiment if we know exactly what this experience 
presents, which is why we need a  Cartesian phenomenology of embodiment. This 
paper, then, lays some of the groundwork for an investigation of the union. 
 Preliminaries 
 According to Descartes and Malebranche, our overall sensory experience is the 
result of a complicated psycho-physiological process. Descartes distinguishes three 
grades of sensory response: (1) the stimulation of the sense organs and the resulting 
alteration  in  the brain, (2) feelings of  pleasure , pain, thirst, hunger, color, sound, 
taste, and so on, immediately produced in the mind, and (3) habitual  judgments that 
construct the sensory world out of the raw sense impressions of the second stage 
( O/R 6, AT VII 437/CSM II 294). Suppose I see a turquoise balloon. At the fi rst 
grade, my eyes and visual cortex are stimulated. Second, an elliptical turquoise 
patch is consciously presented in my visual fi eld. I will call this a ‘sensation’. Third, 
I judge that the turquoise patch is a turquoise sphere ahead of me, which results in 
my overall sensory experience as of a voluminous turquoise balloon. I will  use the 
terms ‘sensory perception’ and ‘sensory experience’ to refer to the overall con-
scious result of sensory processing, jointly constituted by the second and third 
stages, and which together determine the way the sensory world appears to us. 9 
 Malebranche agrees with the broad outlines of Descartes’ account, though he 
denies that the mind plays an active role at the third stage ( Search , I.10.6, OCM I 
129–130/LO 52). He introduces the notion of a “natural judgment”  that corrects and 
enriches the sensory impressions consciously presented at the second stage. Natural 
 judgments construct our sensory experience. We do not make natural judgments for 
ourselves. Rather, they are hard-wired into our sensory systems, such that they are 
Merleau-Ponty ( 1968 ), Williams ( 1978 ), Cottingham ( 1986 ), Alanen ( 2003 ), Simmons ( 2003b , 
 2008 ), Brown ( 2006 ), Carriero ( 2009 ), Kolesnik-Antoine ( 2009 ), and Curley and Koivuniemi 
( 2015 ). 
8  Gouhier ( 1962 ), Alanen ( 2003 ), and Simmons ( unpublished ) emphasize this point. 
9  For a more detailed account of this process see Simmons ( 2003a ). 
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“made in us and for us” by God, and needn’t involve any assent on our part. 
Malebranche suggests that we should think of natural judgments as “compound 
sensations” built up out of simpler sensations, thus highlighting their passivity. 10 
Indeed, Malebranche explicitly distinguishes these natural judgments from the free 
judgments we make when we culpably affi rm that things are as they sensorily 
appear, whereas Descartes tends to run these two kinds of judgment together. 
 The Target Phenomenon 
 Descartes and Malebranche describe the sensory experience of having a body in 
many interchangeable ways. They do not draw a sharp distinction, for instance, 
between experiencing a body (1) as  part of me, (2) as  mine , and (3) as something 
I’m  united with. Phenomenologically, however, it seems reasonable to blur these 
characterizations of our bodily experience. Consider, fi rst, the lack of phenomeno-
logical distinction between experiencing the body as  mine and as  part of me . In 
 Meditation 6 , the meditator switches between talking about the body she “regarded 
as part of myself or perhaps even as my whole self” and “the body which by some 
special right I called ‘mine’ ” ( M6 , AT VII 74–76/CSM II 51–52). Similarly, 
Malebranche writes: “[God] discloses creatures to us…as belonging to us and form-
ing a part of us when the  perception is very interesting and very lively [ fort interes-
sante & fort vive ], as is pain” ( Elucidations VI, OCM III 66/LO 575). 11 These 
passages suggest that, in bodily awareness, there is no felt difference between what 
is  mine and what is  part of me . 
 Descartes and Malebranche aren’t simply ignoring the  metaphysical distinction 
between ownership and partial  constitution . Something can be mine in different 
ways. A pair of socks is mine if it is my property. A hand is mine if it is part of my 
body. An action is mine if I perform it. A thought is mine if I think it. A mind is 
mine if it is the subject of my  mental life. Sometimes being mine implies being part 
of me, whereas sometimes it doesn’t. My socks are mine, but not part of me, whereas 
the sense in which my mind is mine implies that it is part, and perhaps even the 
whole, of myself. Crucially, the experiential mine-ness of my body is more like the 
mine-ness of my mind than the mine-ness of my socks: I experience one human 
body as mine in the sense that I experience this body as  partially constitutive of 
myself. That’s why Descartes claims that it is “ by some special right ” that I call a 
single human body “mine” ( M6 , AT VII 74–76/CSM II 51–52). A special form of 
ownership is at issue here. 
 Descartes and Malebranche also deny that there is a sharp phenomenological 
distinction between experiencing  the body as part of me , and experiencing  myself as 
10  See  Search I.7.4, OCM I 97/LO 34;  Search I.9.3, OCM I 116/LO 45; and  Search I.14.1, OCM I 
156/LO 68. 
11  See also  Search V.5, OCM II 172/LO 365. 
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joined or united to a body . Descartes holds that experiencing oneself as united to 
something generally implies experiencing it as part of oneself. In the  Passions , for 
example, he writes:
 considering [his children] as other selves [ considerant comme d’autres soy-mesme ], [a 
good father] seeks their good as he does his own, or even more assiduously. For represent-
ing that he and they together form a whole [ se representant que luy & eux font un tout ] of 
which he is not the better part, he often puts their interests before his own and is not afraid 
of sacrifi cing himself in order to save them. 12 
 Because the good father represents himself as united to his children in such a 
way that “he and they together form a whole”, the father’s sense of self expands to 
include his children. Malebranche explicitly applies the general phenomenological 
principle to the body: “through the instinct of sensation, I am persuaded that my 
soul is joined to my body, or that my body forms part of my being” ( Search V.5, 
OCM II 172/LO 365). 
 Again, there seems to be an important  metaphysical difference between union 
and partial  constitution . If I am handcuffed to a chair, I am united to it in some sense, 
but the chair does not thereby become part of me. But just as there are many forms 
of ownership, so too there are many different forms of union ( Letter to Chanut, 1 
February 1647 , AT IV 610/CSMK III 310). Some forms of union imply that one 
entity is engulfed and incorporated by another entity, whereas other forms of union 
do not. When a man gets drawn into a crowd, for example, the crowd swallows him 
up, so that this  individual becomes merged with the group. Similarly, when I experi-
ence a body as something that is united to  me , I seem to envelop this body, so that 
the phenomenological limits of myself expand to include it. I read Descartes as 
making this point in the famous “pilot in a ship” passage in  Meditation 6:
 [n]ature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am not 
merely lodged in my body as a sailor is in his ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as 
it were, intermingled with my body, so that I compose one thing with it. ( M6 , AT VII 81/
CSM II 56) 
 When Descartes writes that I am “as it were, intermingled” with my body, he is 
saying (at least) that I am experientially united to my body in such a way that my 
body  feels like it is part of myself, like a raindrop coalescing into the ocean. 
 Descartes and Malebranche do not merely recognize that I experience one human 
body as  part of myself ,  mine , and  united to me . They provide an account of this 
experience, by identifying more basic aspects of our sensory experience on which 
our overall sense of bodily ownership depends. What they give us, in effect, is an 
analysis of the structure of the  phenomenology of embodiment. In the remainder of 
the paper, I will explain the role that affective bodily sensations play in this 
structure. 
12  Passions II.82, AT XI 389/CSM I 357. See also  Letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647 , AT IV 613/
CSMK III 312. 
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 Bodily Sensations and the Sense of Self 
 Bodily sensations seem to play a critical role in explaining our sense of bodily own-
ership. I see, touch, hear, and smell many human bodies, but there is only one human 
body in which I experience bodily sensations, such as pleasurable sensations and 
pains, hunger and thirst, and proprioceptive and kinesthetic sensations. This body is 
the body that I experience as mine, and many philosophers have argued that bodily 
sensations somehow explain our experiential identifi cation with the body. 13 
 Both Descartes and Malebranche maintain that my sense that one human body is 
 mine and  part of myself is grounded in bodily sensations. 14 More specifi cally, they 
attribute a special role to affective sensations felt to be located in the body: namely, 
the sensations of  pleasure and pain, hunger and thirst, which feel good or bad. This 
emphasis on the affective aspect of bodily sensations – their felt goodness or bad-
ness – sets Descartes and Malebranche apart from most contemporary discussions 
of the sense of bodily ownership, which tend to assume that bodily sensations 
ground a sense of ownership insofar as they present the body from a peculiar inter-
nal spatial perspective, i.e. “from the inside”.  Why Descartes and Malebranche 
focus especially on affective bodily sensations is a question I will take up in the next 
section. For now I’m just trying to establish the interpretive claim that they do focus 
on this subset of bodily sensations. 
 Let’s start with Descartes. When the meditator explains her reasons for identify-
ing with one human body in  Meditation 6, the bodily sensations she cites all feel 
good or bad to some degree. They all have an affective aspect:
 [as] for the body which by some special right I called ‘mine’, my belief that this body, more 
than any other, belonged to me had some justifi cation […]. I felt all my appetites and emo-
tions in, and on account of, this body; and fi nally, I was aware of pain and pleasurable 
sensations [ titillationem voluptatis ] in parts of this body, but not in other bodies external to 
it ( M6 , AT VII 76/CSM II 52, translation mine) 
 Since the meditator is reviewing the pre-philosophical beliefs she formed by tak-
ing her sensory experience at face value, we can read this passage as describing the 
contents of her sensory experience. My experience of “this body” as  mine is to be 
explained, at least in part, by the fact that I experience “all my  appetites ” as well as 
“pain and pleasurable sensations” as located in it (ibid.). 15 Crucially, appetites, pains 
13  See, for example, Merleau-Ponty ( 1945 ), Brewer ( 1995 ), Martin ( 1995 ), Cassam ( 1997 ), de 
Vignemont ( 2007 ), Valberg ( 2007 ), and Johnston ( 2010 ). 
14  For relevant texts in Descartes, see  M6 , AT VII 76/CSM I 52;  M6 , AT VII 80/CSM II 56;  Letter 
to Elizabeth, 28 June 1643 , AT III 694/CSMK III 228; and  Passions I.24, AT XI 347/CSM I 337. 
For similar texts in Malebranche, see  Search I.12.4, OCM I 137/LO 57;  Search I.12.5, OCM I 
138–139/LO 58;  Search V.5, OCM II 172/LO 366;  Elucidations VI, OCM III 66/LO 575;  Treatise 
on Morality I.10.5, OCM XI 118;  DM V.7, OCM XII 118/JS 78; and  Dialogues on Death II, OCM 
XIII 408–409. 
15  For the purposes of this paper, I bracket the contribution the passions make to our sense of bodily 
ownership. That being said, it is unclear whether Descartes is drawing a sharp distinction between 
passions and other bodily sensations in this context. 
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and pleasurable sensations are all examples of bodily sensations that feel good or 
bad. Thirst, for example, is an unpleasant sensation that prompts me to drink. These 
affective bodily sensations make  this body feel like  my body, or  this body feel like 
 part of me . Similarly, in the “pilot in a ship” passage quoted above, Descartes claims 
that my “sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on” teach me that “I am very 
closely joined, and as it were, intermingled” with one human body ( M6 , AT VII 81/
CSM II 56). More than anything else, pain rivets one’s sense of self to the body. 16 
 Malebranche too emphasizes the special role of affective bodily sensations in 
explaining the feeling that one human body is  mine and  part of myself , although his 
terminology tends to obscure this aspect of his view. In the  Search , Malebranche 
claims that it is specifi cally “strong and lively sensations” that make one human 
body feel like part of myself. He writes:
 strong and lively sensations startle [ étonnent ] the mind and rouse [ réveillent ] it with some 
force, because they are very agreeable or very disagreeable [ fort agréables ou fort incom-
modes ]: such are pain, pleasurable sensations [ chatouillement ], extremes of heat or cold, 
and generally all those accompanied not only by traces in the brain but also by movements 
of spirits toward the body’s interior parts, i.e., by a movement of spirits conducive to chang-
ing the body’s position and to exciting the passions. 17 
 For strong and lively sensations, “the soul can hardly prevent itself from recog-
nizing that they belong to it in some way” ( Search I.12.5, OCM 138–139/LO 58). 
Because these sensations are experientially confused with the body, we thereby feel 
that the body “belongs to us” and is “part of ourselves” (ibid . ). 18 
 Although Malebranche is very clear  that strong and lively sensations confer a 
sense of bodily ownership, it is much less clear  what the defi ning feature of this 
category is supposed to be, in  virtue of which these sensations make us identify with 
the body. We might be tempted to assume that their defi ning feature is that they are 
perceptually vivid  or attention-grabbing: why else would Malebranche call them 
“strong and lively”? 19 But it would be a mistake to yield to this interpretive tempta-
tion. In fact, a careful reading of the texts reveals that the explanatorily fundamental 
feature of these sensations is that they are pleasurable or painful, i.e. that they feel 
good or bad. 20 The expression “strong and lively sensations” is an awkwardly cho-
sen term of art, and should not be interpreted too literally. 
16  Simmons ( 2008 ) offers an alternative reading of this passage, according to which Descartes’ 
view is that these bodily sensations confer a sense of bodily ownership in virtue of the fact that 
these sensations are interoceptive. 
17  Search I.12.4, OCM I 137/LO 57. I translate ‘ chatouillement ’ as ‘pleasurable sensation’ in this 
context, rather than the more literal ‘tickling’. In the  Treatise Descartes defi nes ‘ chatouillement ’ as 
“a certain bodily pleasure [ une certaine volupté corporelle ]” which “is very close to pain in respect 
of its cause but quite opposite in its effect” ( Treatise , AT XI 144/CSM I 103). 
18  See also  Search I.12.5, OCM I 138–139/LO 58;  Search V.5, OCM II 172/LO 366;  Elucidations 
VI, OCM III 66/LO 575;  Treatise on Morality I.10.5, OCM XI 118;  DM V.7, OCM XII 118/JS 78; 
and  Dialogues on Death II, OCM XIII 408–409. 
19  Simmons ( 2008 ) reads Malebranche this way. 
20  Gueroult ( 1959 , v. III, p. 52) recognizes this point. 
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 Consider the passage where Malebranche introduces the concept of strong and 
lively sensations: “[s]trong and lively sensations are those that startle and forcefully 
rouse the mind  because they are either quite pleasant or else very unpleasant ( fort 
agréables ou fort incommodes )” ( Search I.12.4, OCM I 137–138/LO 57, emphasis 
mine). This passage suggests that the defi ning feature of strong and lively sensations 
is that they are “quite pleasant or very unpleasant”, and attention-grabbing  only  as 
a result. Similarly, in the  Dialogues on Death , Malebranche writes:
 if the idea that you have of that wall struck you with a sentiment of pain, instead of touching 
you only with a sensation of whiteness, you would regard that wall as part of yourself: 
because you cannot doubt that pain does not belong to you, as you can now with regards to 
whiteness. Because not having now a clear idea, neither of your soul nor of your modifi ca-
tions, you judge only by sentiment.  Now you feel well that pain belongs to you, because it 
makes you unhappy: and you do not feel that color belongs to you, because it doesn’t do you 
any benefi t or harm. ( Dialogues on Death II, OCM XIII 408–409, emphasis mine) 21 
 Bodily sensations confer a sense of ownership insofar as they make us happy or 
unhappy. And that is just to say that bodily sensations confer a sense of ownership 
insofar as they are pleasurable or painful, or, more generally, insofar as they are 
affective ( Treatise on Morality I.10.8, OCM XI 119). 
 Interestingly, Malebranche also seems to be committed to the claim that strong 
and lively sensations are intrinsically motivational, in  virtue of their affective char-
acter. This claim follows from his background view that  pleasure and pain set the 
will in motion. In the  Search , for example, he writes that “if one takes pleasure in 
general, insofar as it contains intellectual ( raisonnables ) pleasures, as well as sen-
sible pleasures, it seems certain to me that it is the principle or unique motive of 
 natural love, or of all the movements of the soul towards whatever good there might 
be, since we can only love what pleases” ( Search IV.5.2, OCM II 47/LO 288). 
Moreover, the texts bear out the interpretive claim that strong and lively sensa-
tions – which ground the sense of bodily ownership – are intrinsically motivational 
for Malebranche. For example, he writes that strong and lively sensations “force-
fully  rouse the mind” because they are “quite pleasant or very unpleasant” ( Search 
I.12.4, OCM I 137–138/LO 57). Similarly, he claims that “lively and interesting 
sensations must be felt in the pricked fi nger in order to pull it away, and not the pin” 
( Search I.11.3, OCM I 133/LO 55). 22 These sensations  enliven and  interest the will, 
such that they motivate us to act in certain ways. 
 What Is Special About Affective Bodily Sensations? 
 Why might Descartes and Malebranche insist that affective bodily sensations are 
the key to our sense of embodiment? Why do sensations that feel good or bad – like 
pain, pleasure, hunger, thirst and so on – make the body in which they are felt to be 
21  See  Search V.5, OCM II 172/LO 366. 
22  See  DM V.7, OCM XII 118/JS 79. 
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located  seem to be part of myself? My proposal is that the projection of affective 
bodily sensations onto the body makes me feel as though my well-being consists in 
the preservation of the body. In other words, according to Descartes and Malebranche, 
we feel embodied because we experience ourselves as having a bodily good. When 
I step on a nail, for example, I feel a sharp stab of pain located in the foot. The pain-
ful sensation grounds my feeling that the foot is  part of myself because this experi-
ence represents damage to the foot as though it were damage  to me . 
 I read Descartes as endorsing this account of bodily ownership when the medita-
tor rediscovers her body in  Meditation 6. The meditator describes her experience as 
follows:
 [t]here is nothing that my own nature teaches me more vividly, than that I have a body, 
which is damaged when I feel pain, which needs food and drink when I am hungry or 
thirsty, and so on. So I should not doubt that there is some truth in this. 23 
 The meditator’s nature doesn’t simply teach her that she has a body, full stop. On 
the contrary, the meditator experiences herself as having a-body-with-needs-to-be 
satisfi ed, or as having a-body-with-interests-to-be-pursued. Her experience of hav-
ing a body and her experience of the body’s needs and interests are not distinct from 
one another; rather, she experiences the body as  belonging to her and as  part of 
herself in  virtue of experiencing its needs and interest – that is, in virtue of her pain-
ful awareness of the body’s damage, her unpleasant awareness of its need for food 
and drink, and so forth. 
 Descartes’s meaning is obscured by the standard translation by Cottingham, 
Stoothoff and Murdoch (CSM), which reads as follows: “[t]here is nothing that my 
own nature teaches me more vividly than that I have a body, and that when I feel 
pain there is something wrong with the body, and that when I am hungry or thirsty 
the body needs food and drink, and so on” ( M6 , AT VII 80/CSM II 56). The prob-
lem with the CSM translation is that it presents the teachings of nature as a laundry 
list, without any signifi cant connection between them. It suggests that the medita-
tor’s discovery that she has a body is distinct from the feeling of pain that makes her 
aware that something is wrong with her body. But the original Latin text and French 
translation seem clear that nature teaches the meditator that she has a body  through 
the feelings of pain, hunger, and thirst that disclose the body’s needs. We discover 
that we have a body because we become aware of the body’s interests, just as we 
might simultaneously learn that a man exists and is in trouble when we hear him call 
for help. 24 
 Moreover, the meditator’s experience of the body’s needs is personal. There is all 
the difference in the world between seeing that someone else is thirsty and needs a 
drink – for example, because he is drenched in sweat on a hot day – and feeling 
23  M6 , AT VII 80/ CSM II 56. Here is the Latin and French: “quam quod habeam corpus, cui male 
est cum dolorem sentio, quod cibo vel potu indiget, cum famem aut sitim patior, & similia/que j’ai 
un corps qui est mal disposé quand je sens de la douleur, qui a besoin de manger ou boire, quand 
j’ai les sentiments de la faim ou de la soif, etc.” ( M6 , AT VII 80/CSM II 56). 
24 After developing this reading of Descartes on my own, it was brought to my attention that John 
Carriero also makes this point in his book  Between Two Worlds ( 2009 , p. 393). 
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thirsty oneself. Crucially, the meditator experiences the body’s needs as though they 
were her own. When the body needs drink, the meditator feels like  she needs to fi nd 
a glass of water, even though it is really the body that is dehydrated. As the medita-
tor explains, when the body’s throat is dry:
 this sets in motion the nerves of the throat, which in turn move the inner parts of the brain. 
This motion produces in the mind a sensation of thirst, because the most useful thing for us 
to know about the whole business is that  we need to drink for the conservation of our health. 
( M6 , AT VII 88/CSM II 61, emphasis mine) 
 Similarly, when the body needs food,  she feels hungry, even though,  qua imma-
terial mind, she doesn’t need anything to eat. And when the body is damaged,  she 
feels pain, which makes her feel as though she should protect the body. More gener-
ally, affective bodily sensations represent the body’s needs and interests – the body’s 
good and evil – as belonging to the meditator. As Descartes writes in the  Passions , 
pleasurable sensations represent the “body’s healthy condition and strength […] as 
a good which belongs to [the soul] in so far as it is united with the body” ( Passions 
II.94, AT XI 399/CSM I 362).  Pleasure doesn’t simply feel good: it somehow rep-
resents the body’s health as good for me. I feel healthy when my body feels healthy. 
Similarly, with regards to pain, he writes that it “represents [bodily damage and 
weakness] as evils which are always  unpleasant to the soul ” (ibid., emphasis 
mine). 25 
 Although extremely suggestive, Descartes’s account is sketchy. He points out 
 that we experience the body’s needs as our own. But he doesn’t really explain  why 
or  how . He doesn’t really explain, for example, how feeling a painful sensation as 
localized in the body makes it feel as though the body’s damage is  damage to me . 
Fortunately, Malebranche fi lls in some of the details, in a way that seems to be in 
keeping with Descartes’s original insights. Malebranche follows Descartes in claim-
ing that the experience of the body’s interests as my own grounds my experience of 
the body as part of myself. He writes:
 [a]t the present time nature is undoubtedly corrupted – the body acts too forcefully on the 
mind. Instead of humbly representing its needs to the mind, the body tyrannizes it and tears 
it away from God, to whom it should be inseparably united, and unceasingly applies the 
25  Carriero recognizes that, according to Descartes, we experience our body’s interest as our own, 
and reads him as making this point in the famous “pilot in a ship” passage (Carriero  2009 , p. 394). 
That being said, Carriero suggests that the mind has an antecedent concern for the body that 
explains why the mind takes the body’s interests and needs as its own. He writes, “God’s setting 
things up so that the cognitive agent’s confused cognition of its hurt foot registers as unpleasant 
works best against a background where it cares about its body, so that the body’s bads, goods, and 
needs are its bads, goods, and needs” (Carriero  2009 , p. 395, emphasis mine). In contrast, I think 
we should reverse the order of explanation. On my reading, the reason the mind cares so much 
about the body is precisely because the mind experiences the body’s needs as its own. Shapiro also 
argues that, according to Descartes, the mind “takes” the body’s interests as its own, although she 
seems to think of this “taking” as something we actively do (Shapiro  2003 ,  2011 ). See also Louis 




mind to the search after sensible things that might be of use in its preservation. After the 
Fall, the mind became, as it were, material and terrestrial. 26 
 Because the mind phenomenologically identifi es its own interests with the body’s 
preservation, and experiences the body’s needs as though they were its own, the 
mind becomes “as it were, material and terrestrial” in the  sense that we experience 
the body as part, and perhaps even the whole, of ourselves (ibid.). 27 But Malebranche 
pushes his analysis a bit further than Descartes, by explaining  why experiencing 
affective bodily sensations – namely,  pleasure and pain – as located in the body 
makes us feel as though the body’s interests are our own. 
 According to Malebranche, our fundamental interest consists in experiencing 
pleasure and avoiding pain. 28 Note that in the subsequent discussion I will follow 
Malebranche in using the terms ‘interest’, ‘well-being’, and ‘happiness’ as equiva-
lent. In the  Search , for example, Malebranche writes that “pleasure is the way of 
being that is the best and the most agreeable to the soul: I say pleasure precisely, 
taken as pleasure [ je dis le plaisir précisement, en tant que plaisir ] […] pleasure  is 
well-being [ le plaisir est le bien-être ]” ( Search IV.5.2, OCM II 47–48/LO 288). 
Similarly, in the  Treatise on Morality , Malebranche equates happiness with “actual 
pleasure”, and unhappiness with pain. 29 But he also argues that we experience  plea-
sure and pain as though they were states of the body. In the  Dialogues , for example, 
he writes: “it seems to me that it is my fi nger which feels the pain of a prick”. 30 
Putting these two claims together, it follows that we experience our fundamental 
interest as consisting in the body’s state. Assuming that we are  naturally concerned 
with our own well-being, this experiential confusion will channel our concern for 
our well-being towards the preservation of the body. 
 We can think of this sensory experience as having the following argumentative 
structure, where the premises combine to produce the compound sensation that is 
my overall sensory experience:
 (1)  I experience my pleasures and pains as determining my happiness. 
 (2)  I experience my pleasures and pains as though they were the states of a single human 
body. 
 Therefore,
 (3)  I experience the states of this body as determining my happiness. 
26  Search V.1, OCM II 130/ LO 339. See also  Preface to the Search , OCM I 11/LO xxxiv;  Search 
I.12.3, OCM I 137/LO 57, and OCM XIV 15. 
27  Interestingly, Malebranche argues that it is a quite general phenomenological principle that if I 
phenomenologically identify with something’s interests, I will thereby experience this thing as part 
of myself ( Search IV.13.1, OCM II 114/LO 330). 
28  See Alquié ( 1974 ), Chap. VIII-C, for helpful discussion. 
29  Treatise on Morality I.10.8, OCM XI 119. See  Treatise on Morality II.2.11, OCM XI 164; and 
II.14.1, OCM XI 269. 
30  DM I.1, OCM XII 33/JS 6. See  Search I.12.3, OCM I 137/LO 57;  Search I.12.4, OCM I 139/LO 
58; and  Search II.i.5.1, OCM I 215/LO 102. 
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 When I stub my toe, for example, I experience the resulting painful sensation as 
something that is in my interests to avoid. The pain is “an evil and makes actually 
unhappy the one who suffers it, in the instant that he suffers it, and to the extent that 
he suffers it” ( Search IV.10.1, OCM II 80/LO 309). But my painful sensation is 
experienced as a state of the foot. Thus I experience the damage in the foot as “an 
evil” that makes me “actually unhappy”, and that is in my interests to alleviate 
(ibid . ). 
 More specifi cally, the experiential confusion of  pleasure and pain with states of 
the body leads us to identify our happiness with the preservation of the body. Our 
sensory system is hard-wired in such a way that it seems as though pleasure  is 
bodily fl ourishing or health, and pain  is bodily damage or sickness. This is perhaps 
clearest in the case of pain. As Malebranche writes:
 [i]t must be noted that, our senses having been given to us for the conservation of our body, 
it is very appropriate that we [naturally] judge as we do with regards to sensible qualities. It 
is much more advantageous to feel pain and heat as though they were in our body, than if 
we judged that they were in the objects which caused them, because [the changes in the 
sensory organs accompanying] heat and pain are capable of harming our members, it is 
appropriate that we are warned when they are threatened, in order to prevent them from 
being damaged. 31 
 Similarly, it is important that we feel pleasure when our body is healthy and in 
good condition, so that we maintain it in this state ( Search V.3, OCM II 157/LO 
355;  Search V.4, OCM II 161/LO). Even Adam, before the Fall, “felt [ ressentoit ] 
pleasure in that which perfected his body” ( Search I.5.1, OCM I 71/LO 19). Thus 
 pleasure and pain “ interest [the mind] in the body’s preservation” ( DM IV.20, OCM 
XII 104/JS 67). 32 
 The experiential confusion cuts in both directions: pleasure is experienced as a 
state of the body, and bodily health as an intrinsically pleasant qualitative state (and 
similarly for pain). From this it follows that our happiness  seems to consist in main-
taining the body in a healthy state conducive to its preservation, which is tanta-
mount to saying that we phenomenologically identify with the body’s interests. As 
Malebranche writes, “[the soul] takes the good of the body for its own good, loves 
it, and attaches itself to it still more closely with its will than it has ever been attached 
by nature’s initial arrangement” ( Search V.4, OCM II 163/LO 360). 33 It feels as 
though  my good and  my body’s preservation are one and the same. 
 Just to be clear, Malebranche’s considered view is not that our phenomenological 
identifi cation with the body’s good occurs in two distinct stages: we do not have a 
prior awareness of the body’s interests such that the projection of  pleasure and pain 
subsequently leads us to identify with these interests and take them as our own. On 
the contrary, I fi rst discover that my body is damaged, for example, when I experi-
31  Search I.12.5, OCM I 142/LO 60. See  Search I.5.1, OCM I 72/LO 21;  Search I.10.5, OCM I 
126–127/LO 51;  Search V.4, OCM II 161/LO 359; and  Christian Conversations , OCM IV 37. 
32  See  Search I.10.5, OCM I 127–128/LO 51–52; and  Elucidations XV, OCM III 226–227/LO 670. 
33  See  Search III.i.1.2, OCM I 385/LO 200; and  Search V.5, OCM II 172/LO 365. 
C. Chamberlain
231
ence my body’s state  as painful . And I cannot help but experience this  painful-state- 
of-the-body as taking a toll on my happiness. Malebranche writes:
 if we put a hot coal in the hand of a sleeping man, or heated his hands behind his back. […] 
It seems to me that it is indubitable that the fi rst thing that this man would perceive [ apper-
cevroit ] as soon as the coal touched his hand would be pain. ( Search III.i.1.3, OCM I 387/
LO 201) 
 Our most basic awareness of the body’s needs comes with the identifi cation built 
right into it. 
 This account seems to face an obvious objection. The objection is that not all 
pleasant and unpleasant sensations make us identify with the interests of the entity 
in which they are felt to be located. For example, a cupcake tastes pleasant and 
makes me happy, but I do not thereby feel like the cupcake’s interests are my inter-
ests, or that the cupcake is part of me. So what’s the difference between a pleasur-
able feeling of warmth in a foot, which grounds my identifi cation with the entity in 
which it is felt to be located, and the pleasant taste of the cupcake, which does not? 
 One crucial difference is that I literally feel pleasure as located in the foot, 
whereas I do not literally experience pleasure as located in the cupcake. In fact, 
Malebranche seems to hold that I  only feel pleasurable and painful sensations as 
located in the human body which I consequently experience as mine. He writes:
 [t]he most general cause of the errors of our senses is […] that we attribute the soul’s sensa-
tions to external bodies and to our own body: that we attach colors to the surfaces of bodies; 
that we spread light, sounds and smells in the air; and that  we fi x pain and pleasurable 
sensations [ la douleur et le chatouillement ]  in the parts of our body , which receive certain 
changes from the movements of [external] bodies they encounter. ( Search V.6, OCM II 178/
LO 370, emphasis mine) 
 We feel pain as located in the fi nger that is pricked, for example, rather than in 
the pin that pricks it ( Search I.11.2, OCM I 132/LO 54). 34 We might perceive the pin 
as harmful, as disagreeable, as to-be-avoided, or as containing a disposition to pro-
duce pain. But we do not perceive the pin as  painful . If I did locate pain in the pin, 
then I would thereby experience the pin as an extension of my body. 
 Similarly, when I bite into the cupcake, I experience pleasure diffused through-
out the mouth, tongue, and perhaps the rest of my body, rather than as contained in 
the cupcake. I may experience the cupcake as containing a disposition to produce 
pleasure. But I do not experience pleasure  located inside the cupcake. Thus 
Malebranche can respond to the cupcake objection by emphasizing that, on his 
account, we only identify with those objects in which  pleasure and pain are felt  to 
be located . Although I experience the cupcake as giving me pleasure, the pleasure 
itself is not sensorily located in the cupcake. So the cupcake does not provide a 
counterexample to his account. 
34  See  Search I.11.3, OCM I 132/LO;  Search I.12.5, OCM I 142/LO 60; and  Dialogues VI.3, OCM 
XII 136. 
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 Conclusion 
 According to Descartes and Malebranche, affective bodily sensations – such as 
pain, pleasurable sensations, hunger and thirst – are the key to our sense of embodi-
ment. These bodily sensations make me feel as though it is in my interests to pursue 
the body’s interests, which grounds the experience of the body as  belonging to me 
and as  part of myself . More specifi cally, Malebranche argues that although  pleasure 
and pain are really states of mind, they are experienced as though they are located 
in, and modifi cations of, the body. Pleasure is experientially confused with bodily 
health/fl ourishing, and pain with bodily illness/damage. This confusion makes us 
experience our happiness as consisting in the preservation of the body, which, 
Malebranche suggests, explains why we experience the body’s interests as our own. 
In other words, we feel embodied because we feel like we have a bodily good. 
 This phenomenological result raises an important question: according to these 
 Cartesians , does our experience of being partially constituted by a body, and as hav-
ing a bodily good, contain any truth? The short answer is: yes. There has to be some 
truth in the sense of bodily ownership. If we take seriously the meditator’s claim in 
 Meditation 6 that “everything that I am taught by nature contains some truth,” then 
the sense of bodily ownership cannot be wholly illusory ( M6 , AT VII 80/CSM II 
56). Indeed, the meditator goes on to say that “[t]here is  nothing that my own nature 
teaches me more vividly, than that I have a body. […] So I should not doubt that 
there is some truth in this” ( M6 , AT VII 80/ CSM II 56, emphasis mine). What is 
much less clear, however, is what this truth might be. Hard philosophical work is 
required to sort out what is true and what is false in this experience. And that is a 
task for another day. 35 
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